THE INSURABLE INTEREST® 
October 2009, Volume II, Issue III
 
 
Featured Article
dog bite
 
What Is A "Dog Bite?"
 
Court Says Broken Skin Is Not Required
 
In This Issue
Trial Court Says Broken Skin Is Not Required To Satisfy "Bite" Requirement Of Dog Bite Statute
Superior Court Dismisses Lawsuit Seeking Broad Discovery For The Defense Of A New Jersey Personal Injury Protection Arbitration
Identity Of Toxic Mold Not Required To Prove Medical Causation
 
The Insurable Interest Team
Joseph M. Powell
Managing Partner
 
Thomas J. Mooney
Of Counsel
&
Article Contributor
Jose D. Roman
Partner,
Layout, Editing, &
Article Contributor

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From Powell & Roman, LLC
 
The Insurable Interest is a newsletter by the attorneys of Powell & Roman, LLC.  We specialize in Insurance Defense and Insurance Coverage law in New Jersey and New York. We strive to keep ourselves informed of new developments relevant to our practice and the needs of our clients.  This newsletter is our way of sharing this valuable information with our clients and colleagues in the insurance industry.
 
Trial Court Says Broken Skin Is Not Required To Satisfy "Bite" Requirement Of Dog Bite Statute
 
The New Jersey "Dog Bite Statute," N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, holds dog owners strictly liable for the behavior of their pets under certain circumstances.  In order for the strict liability statute to apply, the following three elements must be satisfied:
 
     1. the defendant must be the owner of the dog;
 
     2. the dog must bite the plaintiff; and
 
     3. the bite must occur while the plaintiff is either in a public
         place or lawfully in a private place.
 
The purpose of the statute was recently highlighted by the trial court in DeVivo v. Anderson, where it noted that "all dogs, even though ordinarily harmless, have a potential for biting, and that an owner should, as the social price of keeping a dog, compensate those innocently sustaining an injury in that fashion."
 
The plaintiff, Sandra DeVivo, claimed that she was walking past the front of the defendants' residence when their unleashed German Shepard grabbed her right forearm in its jaws.  Since it was wintertime, plaintiff was wearing a coat and sweater. As a result, no actual puncture was made to her skin. The hospital records noted that there was right arm swelling but that her skin was intact. Although the medical claims were not set forth in any detail, it appeared that plaintiff was asserting a soft tissue shoulder injury allegedly caused by the twisting and wrenching of the German Shepard upon her arm.
 
The defendants acknowledged that they were the owners of the dog and that the event occurred while the plaintiff was in a public place. However, they moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that there was no "dog bite" within the meaning of the Dog Bite Statute.  
 
The trial judge, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, noted that the issue as to whether or not "skin must be broken" in order to impose strict liability was an issue of first impression in New Jersey. The court relied on a California case with markedly similar facts.  In that matter, the California court determined that if a body part was indeed "between the jaws, albeit separated from tooth by cloth, a bite occurred."  This reasoning was endorsed by the New Jersey court which then concluded that the "bruising, swelling and other marks of impression" arguably exhibited by plaintiff after the incident, were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.  Finding that the element was satisfied, the court then entered summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiffs.
 
Superior Court Dismisses Lawsuit Seeking Broad Discovery For The Defense Of A New Jersey Personal Injury Protection Arbitration
 
Under the New Jersey scheme, disputes that arise from claims for automobile personal injury protection coverage are submitted for resolution through an arbitration system. The current arbitration system is administered by the National Arbitration Forum. While many medical treatments have been assigned fixed allowable charges under the New Jersey Administrative Code, there are numerous medical procedures for which costs must be reimbursed on a "usual, customary and reasonable" ("UCR") basis. The conflict between medical providers and insurance carriers as to what exactly constitutes "usual, customary and reasonable" is perpetual.
 
In a recent matter reviewed by the New Jersey Appellate Division, the court denied the relief sought by New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company ("NJM") in challenging the UCR calculation of a private surgical center.
 
NJM globally denied all claims by the surgical center pending receipt by the carrier of a set of complete billing and payment histories for one year for each service for which it was requesting reimbursement, this included a schedule of all charges submitted to, and payments received from, all public and private sources, such as other automobile insurance carriers, health insurers, worker's compensation organizations, Medicare, etc. The medical provider complained that the request was oppressive and refused to provide the documents.
 
Relying upon a statute allowing for discovery in the arbitration setting, (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(g)), the carrier then instituted suit requesting an order compelling these materials. It argued that without such billing histories, they were placed at a disadvantage in competently disputing the UCR figures which were being advanced by the medical provider.
 
Although this seems like a reasoned argument, neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division was sympathetic to the position of the carrier. Upon application of the medical provider, the action seeking to enforce the discovery was dismissed. NJM appealed and was, again, unsuccessful at the appellate level.
 
The Appellate Court suggested that the underlying legislation did not allow for the Superior Court to intervene and grant an application for the "sprawling" discovery sought by NJM. It did not dispute the relevancy of some of the materials requested but suggested that any relief had to be accomplished on a "case-by-case" basis and that the decisions regarding allowable discovery would rest in the hands of the dispute resolution professionals (arbitrators). It noted that if such discretion were to be improperly utilized, then the aggrieved party would be allowed to seek intervention through the courts. Unstated, however, is that the standard for review of an arbitrator's decision is quite stringent.
 
The court also suggested that the statutory arbitration scheme was intended to avoid the type of expansive discovery which would be expected in a matter litigated in the Superior Court.
 
The opinion is interesting in that it does not seem to be critical of the substantive positions advanced by either of the parties, but rather rests its decision solely on what appears to be a technical, procedural basis, coupled with the generalized reluctance of the Superior Court to enmesh itself in the arbitration process.
 
The matter is entitled New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company v. Bergen Ambulatory Surgery Center and was decided on October 7, 2009.
 
Identity Of Toxic Mold Not Required To Prove Medical Causation
 
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court recently reinstated a toxic mold personal injury claim that was dismissed based on the purported lack of medical causation between the mold and the plaintiff's injury.  In Smith v. North Ridge at Edison, the plaintiff, Gloria Smith, was a tenant in an apartment complex. She claimed to have sustained a respiratory disorder after being exposed to mold in the basement apartment she occupied. Plaintiff's liability expert found several areas of alleged water infiltration and evidence of a prior mold condition. The liability expert did not identify any specific types of mold.
 
The plaintiff claimed that she began experiencing severe respiratory symptoms while she was a tenant in the apartment. She consulted her primary care physician throughout the relevant time period and, ultimately, consulted Dr. Rodolfo Ouano, an internist. She claimed that the morning before she visited Dr. Ouano, she awoke at 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., unable to breathe. She panicked and crawled outside. She claimed that she sat outside her apartment until 8:00 a.m., noticing that her breathing improved.  She then went to her scheduled appointment with Dr. Ouano. She described her symptoms, the conditions in her apartment, and the treatment she received through her family physician.  Dr. Ouano observed that she had a productive cough of yellow expectorant, labored breathing, and pulmonary wheezing.  He advised her not to go home and to immediately move out of the apartment. She complied, and her condition improved substantially, though she did claim some permanency.  Dr. Ouano, in an expert report, concluded that her medical condition and the resulting permanent physical damage were caused by "harmful conditions present in her residence."  Dr. Ouano also sat for a ­de benne esse deposition and was similarly vague regarding the specific cause of her condition.  Particularly, he could not identify the mold that caused her condition.
 
The trial court found Dr. Ouano's opinion to be insufficient to establish medical causation.  The Appellate Division reversed. The court found that Dr. Ouano made his diagnosis based on the history given by the plaintiff, his clinical examination, medical education, training and experience.  The court noted that this was sufficient to establish medical causation, and that the defendants were free to cross-examine Dr. Ouano at trial.
 
It should be noted that the Appellate Division did not address the sufficiency of the plaintiff's liability expert report.  The trial court declined to decide whether the plaintiff had established liability, and the issue was not before the appellate court.  The appellate court noted that the trial court was free to decide the issue of liability if raised by the defendants.
 
It should also be noted that the court's opinion was "unpublished" and is therefore, not binding precedent.  The opinion, however, can be cited for guidance in future cases.
 
Click Here For A Copy Of The Court's Opinion
 
 
 

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