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Article |
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Court Says Broken Skin Is Not
Required
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| The
Insurable Interest Team |
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Joseph M.
Powell
Managing
Partner
Thomas J.
Mooney
Of Counsel
Jose D.
Roman
Partner,
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From
Powell & Roman, LLC
The Insurable Interest is a newsletter
by the attorneys of Powell & Roman,
LLC. We specialize in
Insurance Defense and Insurance Coverage
law in New Jersey and New York. We
strive to keep ourselves informed
of new developments relevant to our
practice and the needs of our clients.
This newsletter is our way of
sharing this valuable information with
our clients and colleagues in the
insurance industry.
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Trial Court Says Broken Skin Is Not
Required To Satisfy "Bite"
Requirement Of Dog Bite Statute
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The New Jersey "Dog Bite
Statute," N.J.S.A.
4:19-16, holds dog owners strictly
liable for the behavior of their
pets under certain circumstances.
In order for the strict
liability statute to apply, the
following three elements must be
satisfied:
1. the
defendant must be the owner of the
dog;
2. the
dog must bite the plaintiff; and
3. the
bite must occur while the
plaintiff is either in a public
place or lawfully in a private
place.
The purpose of the statute was
recently highlighted by the trial
court in DeVivo v. Anderson,
where it noted that "all
dogs, even though ordinarily
harmless, have a potential for
biting, and that an owner should,
as the social price of keeping a
dog, compensate those innocently
sustaining an injury in that
fashion."
The plaintiff, Sandra DeVivo,
claimed that she was walking past
the front of the defendants'
residence when their unleashed
German Shepard grabbed her right
forearm in its jaws. Since
it was wintertime, plaintiff was
wearing a coat and sweater. As a
result, no actual puncture was
made to her skin. The hospital
records noted that there was right
arm swelling but that her skin was
intact. Although the medical
claims were not set forth in any
detail, it appeared that plaintiff
was asserting a soft tissue
shoulder injury allegedly caused
by the twisting and wrenching of
the German Shepard upon her arm.
The defendants acknowledged that
they were the owners of the dog
and that the event occurred while
the plaintiff was in a public
place. However, they moved to
dismiss the claim on the basis
that there was no "dog
bite" within the meaning of
the Dog Bite Statute.
The trial judge, ruling on
cross-motions for summary
judgment, noted that the issue as
to whether or not "skin must
be broken" in order to impose
strict liability was an issue of
first impression in New Jersey.
The court relied on a California
case with markedly similar facts.
In that matter, the
California court determined that
if a body part was indeed
"between the jaws, albeit
separated from tooth by cloth, a
bite occurred." This
reasoning was endorsed by the New
Jersey court which then concluded
that the "bruising, swelling
and other marks of
impression" arguably
exhibited by plaintiff after the
incident, were sufficient to
satisfy the statutory
requirements. Finding that
the element was satisfied, the
court then entered summary
judgment on the issue of liability
in favor of the plaintiffs.
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Superior Court Dismisses Lawsuit
Seeking Broad Discovery For The
Defense Of A New Jersey Personal
Injury Protection Arbitration
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Under the New Jersey scheme,
disputes that arise from claims for
automobile personal injury
protection coverage are submitted
for resolution through an
arbitration system. The current
arbitration system is administered
by the National Arbitration Forum.
While many medical treatments have
been assigned fixed allowable
charges under the New Jersey
Administrative Code, there are
numerous medical procedures for
which costs must be reimbursed on a
"usual, customary and
reasonable" ("UCR")
basis. The conflict between medical
providers and insurance carriers as
to what exactly constitutes
"usual, customary and
reasonable" is perpetual.
In a recent matter reviewed by the
New Jersey Appellate Division, the
court denied the relief sought by
New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
Company ("NJM") in
challenging the UCR calculation of a
private surgical center.
NJM globally denied all claims by
the surgical center pending receipt
by the carrier of a set of complete
billing and payment histories for
one year for each service for which
it was requesting reimbursement,
this included a schedule of all
charges submitted to, and payments
received from, all public and
private sources, such as other
automobile insurance carriers,
health insurers, worker's
compensation organizations,
Medicare, etc. The medical provider
complained that the request was
oppressive and refused to provide
the documents.
Relying upon a statute allowing for
discovery in the arbitration
setting, (N.J.S.A.
39:6A-13(g)), the carrier then
instituted suit requesting an order
compelling these materials. It
argued that without such billing
histories, they were placed at a
disadvantage in competently
disputing the UCR figures which were
being advanced by the medical
provider.
Although this seems like a reasoned
argument, neither the trial court
nor the Appellate Division was
sympathetic to the position of the
carrier. Upon application of the
medical provider, the action seeking
to enforce the discovery was
dismissed. NJM appealed and was,
again, unsuccessful at the appellate
level.
The Appellate Court suggested that
the underlying legislation did not
allow for the Superior Court to
intervene and grant an application
for the "sprawling"
discovery sought by NJM. It did not
dispute the relevancy of some of the
materials requested but suggested
that any relief had to be
accomplished on a
"case-by-case" basis and
that the decisions regarding
allowable discovery would rest in
the hands of the dispute resolution
professionals (arbitrators). It
noted that if such discretion were
to be improperly utilized, then the
aggrieved party would be allowed to
seek intervention through the
courts. Unstated, however, is that
the standard for review of an
arbitrator's decision is quite
stringent.
The court also suggested that the
statutory arbitration scheme was
intended to avoid the type of
expansive discovery which would be
expected in a matter litigated in
the Superior Court.
The opinion is interesting in that
it does not seem to be critical of
the substantive positions advanced
by either of the parties, but rather
rests its decision solely on what
appears to be a technical,
procedural basis, coupled with the
generalized reluctance of the
Superior Court to enmesh itself in
the arbitration process.
The matter is entitled New Jersey
Manufacturers Insurance Company v.
Bergen Ambulatory Surgery Center
and was decided on October 7, 2009.
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Identity Of Toxic Mold Not Required To
Prove Medical Causation
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The Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court recently
reinstated a toxic mold personal
injury claim that was dismissed
based on the purported lack of
medical causation between the mold
and the plaintiff's injury. In
Smith v. North Ridge at Edison,
the plaintiff, Gloria Smith, was a
tenant in an apartment complex. She
claimed to have sustained a
respiratory disorder after being
exposed to mold in the basement
apartment she occupied. Plaintiff's
liability expert found several areas
of alleged water infiltration and
evidence of a prior mold condition.
The liability expert did not
identify any specific types of mold.
The plaintiff claimed that she began
experiencing severe respiratory
symptoms while she was a tenant in
the apartment. She consulted her
primary care physician throughout
the relevant time period and,
ultimately, consulted Dr. Rodolfo
Ouano, an internist. She claimed
that the morning before she visited
Dr. Ouano, she awoke at 2:00 or 3:00
a.m., unable to breathe. She
panicked and crawled outside. She
claimed that she sat outside her
apartment until 8:00 a.m., noticing
that her breathing improved. She
then went to her scheduled
appointment with Dr. Ouano. She
described her symptoms, the
conditions in her apartment, and the
treatment she received through her
family physician. Dr. Ouano
observed that she had a productive
cough of yellow expectorant, labored
breathing, and pulmonary wheezing.
He advised her not to go home
and to immediately move out of the
apartment. She complied, and her
condition improved substantially,
though she did claim some
permanency. Dr. Ouano, in an
expert report, concluded that her
medical condition and the resulting
permanent physical damage were
caused by "harmful conditions
present in her residence."
Dr. Ouano also sat for a de
benne esse deposition and was
similarly vague regarding the
specific cause of her condition.
Particularly, he could not identify
the mold that caused her condition.
The trial court found Dr. Ouano's
opinion to be insufficient to
establish medical causation. The
Appellate Division reversed. The
court found that Dr. Ouano made his
diagnosis based on the history given
by the plaintiff, his clinical
examination, medical education,
training and experience. The
court noted that this was sufficient
to establish medical causation, and
that the defendants were free to
cross-examine Dr. Ouano at trial.
It should be noted that the
Appellate Division did not address
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
liability expert report. The
trial court declined to decide
whether the plaintiff had
established liability, and the issue
was not before the appellate court.
The appellate court noted that
the trial court was free to decide
the issue of liability if raised by
the defendants.
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