THE INSURABLE INTEREST® 
February 2010, Volume II, Issue IV
 
 
Featured Article
Slip
 
Icy Boardwalk
 
 
Court Says It's Not Adjacent Propety Managers Problem
 
In This Issue
N.J. Court Finds That Commercial Property Owner Is Not Responsible For Adjacent Walkway Maintained By Public Entity
Superior Court Dismisses Lawsuit Seeking Broad Discovery For The Defense Of A New Jersey Personal Injury Protection Arbitration
Identity Of Toxic Mold Not Required To Prove Medical Causation
 
The Insurable Interest Team
Joseph M. Powell
Managing Partner
 
Thomas J. Mooney
Of Counsel
&
Article Contributor
Jose D. Roman
Partner,
Layout, Editing, &
Article Contributor

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From Powell & Roman, LLC
 
The Insurable Interest is a newsletter by the attorneys of Powell & Roman, LLC.  We specialize in Insurance Defense and Insurance Coverage law in New Jersey and New York. We strive to keep ourselves informed of new developments relevant to our practice and the needs of our clients.  This newsletter is our way of sharing this valuable information with our clients and colleagues in the insurance industry.
 

N.J. Court Finds That Commercial Property Owner Is Not Responsible For Adjacent Walkway Maintained By Public Entity

 

The New Jersey Supreme Court first imposed a duty on commercial landowners to reasonably maintain sidewalks abutting their property in a landmark case Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc. Since then, the scope of that duty has been the subject of debate. Recently, in Pote v. City of Atlantic City, the Appellate Division found that a property manager, who manages property along a boardwalk that is maintained by a public entity has no duty to maintain the boardwalk. The case arose out of a slip and fall on ice at Boardwalk Hall in Atlantic City. The plaintiff was attending a show at Boardwalk Hall in which approximately 5,000 people were expected to attend. The plaintiff argued that the managers of Boardwalk Hall derived benefit from foot traffic on the boardwalk and that it was, therefore, fair to impose a duty to maintain the boardwalk free of snow and ice. The plaintiff also argued that her injury was foreseeable to the managers of Boardwalk Hall because she had no choice but to enter and exit Boardwalk Hall from the boardwalk.

 

The managers of Boardwalk Hall attempted to characterize the boardwalk as a public street rather than a sidewalk. This is because there has been no case addressing the duty of a commercial property owner with respect to abutting public walkways that are not simply "sidewalks." The trial court found that the boardwalk was more of a hybrid between a public street and a sidewalk. The trial court further noted that regardless of how the boardwalk was classified, it was clearly a public thoroughfare that was owned, maintained and controlled by the City of Atlantic City and not the property manager. The Appellate Division seemed to agree with this analysis and framed the issue as a question of whether principles of fairness and public policy would support imposing a duty on the commercial property manager. The court recognized that there is no case that imposes a duty on a landowner to clear ice and snow from an abutting public thoroughfare. The court then acknowledged that Boardwalk Hall is uniquely accessed by its patrons only from the boardwalk and that the property manager, therefore, enjoyed some benefit from public use of the boardwalk. The Appellate Division, however, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the property manager could reasonably remedy any unsafe conditions on the boardwalk. It noted that the plaintiff was seeking to compel the property manager to take action on a public thoroughfare and that there was no evidence regarding any proposal as to the location or extent that the property manager should perform maintenance on the boardwalk. There was also no evidence that it had any ability or authority to perform maintenance on the boardwalk. Weighing these and other factors, the court found no duty and affirmed the trial court's dismissal as to the property manager.

 

In our view, the case is helpful in that it clarifies the issue of a commercial property owner's duties with respect to public walkways that that cannot be strictly categorized as "sidewalks." The case may be helpful in resolving issues dealing with public plazas that abut commercial properties.
 

N.J. Appellate Court Says It Was Improper To Reduce "Undoubtedly High" Jury Award

 

"Remittitur" is an arcane tool that allows a trial judge to reduce a jury verdict that is "shocking to the conscience." When used, it often produces interesting results, as highlighted in the recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision in He v. Miller. The decision arose from a personal injury trial verdict that was reduced by the trial judge, reversed by the Appellate Division, reviewed and reversed in part by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and finally, revisited by an Appellate panel.

 

The claim arose from a simple motor vehicle accident where plaintiff was alleged to have suffered four herniated discs in her neck and back. She was treated conservatively, with the exception of several epidural injections. Although she was referred for a surgical consultation, it was determined that she was not a candidate for surgery. She was a housekeeper and claimed that the neck and back pain prevented her from working.

 

A Morris County New Jersey jury awarded her $1,000,000.00 for pain and suffering, and $610,000.00 for past and future lost wages. In addition, her husband was awarded $100,000.00 on a loss of consortium claim.

 

The trial judge did not disturb the award for wages, but reduced the pain and suffering and consortium awards to $200,000.00 and $10,000.00, respectively. The judge's "remittitur" was reversed on appeal. The matter was then appealed by the defendants to the New Jersey Supreme Court which reversed the Appellate Division's decision and remanded the matter to the trial judge for a "complete and searching analysis." After having performed that analysis, the matter was then returned to the Appellate Division for a second review.

 

This most recent appellate review began its own analysis by stating that "to justify judicial interference, the verdict must be wide of the mark and pervaded by a sense of wrongness." The appellate court then criticized the trial court's comparison of the jury's verdict to the verdicts in similar cases. In doing so, the appellate court seemed to suggest that it was improper to compare verdicts that are not based on nearly identical facts. The appellate court also criticized the trial judge's reliance on his own "feel of the case," specifically his observation that the plaintiff did not exhibit any visible signs of pain or discomfort over the course of the four-day trial. The court emphasized that a trial judge is "not a thirteenth and decisive juror." In further harsh words directed at the trial judge, the Appellate Division found his "decision to be erroneous because he viewed as excessive a verdict that did not meet his vision of what lawyers or insurance adjusters might expect a jury to award to a plaintiff who has suffered certain injuries." The court went on to state that the verdict may have been "undoubtedly high, perhaps overly generous," but "verdicts that fall outside of predictable range are not per se excessive."

 

In the end, though the trial judge received criticism, almost to a personal extent, the Appellate Division's opinion still leaves the standard of review rather murky and without practical guidance.

 

N.J. College Is Immune Under Charitable Immunity Act For Death Of Student Living In Dorm

 

A jury verdict in favor of the estate of a student at Fairleigh Dickinson University was recently reversed by the New Jersey Appellate Division based upon the statutory protection granted under the state's Charitable Immunity Act. The tragic case arose from the all-too-common fact pattern of excessive alcohol consumption on campus. Keith Orzech, a twenty-one year old student and resident advisor at Fairleigh Dickinson University, accidentally fell from a fourth-floor dormitory window while in an intoxicated state and died from his injuries. In a point of irony, the plaintiff's position as a resident advisor obligated him to alert the school authorities to any violations of the school alcohol policy. By all indications in the court's opinion, plaintiff himself had directly violated many of the policy's prohibitions. Although it was the summer, plaintiff remained in his university-owned dormitory room in between semesters. During the course of a party in his dormitory suite, he became severely intoxicated. Although the accident was unwitnessed, he was found on the ground outside of the dormitory below his window the following morning.

 

His estate filed suit against the college based on several theories of negligence. The estate argued that the university's alcohol policy was both inadequate and not enforced as written. The argument was essentially that there should have been a blanket "no alcohol" policy applicable to the dormitory buildings. In addition, the estate argued that the school's public safety department was lax in its enforcement of restrictions against excessive intoxication, grain alcohol, and drinking games.

 

Prior to trial, the university made application with the court to dismiss the matter based on the Charitable Immunity Act. The Act grants immunity to an educational entity such as a university, if (a) it is engaged in its charitable/educational purpose at the time of the accident and (b) the claimant is a "beneficiary" of the charitable/educational purpose. The trial court concluded that the deceased was not a beneficiary of the educational experience at the time of this unfortunate occurrence. The court cited the school's failure to enforce its own alcohol policy and, to some extent, the decedent's own conduct.

 

At trial, the jury allocated liability equally between the deceased and the university. The university appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the verdict. The Appellate Division concluded that the university was entitled to immunity because as a dormitory resident, he was a "per se" beneficiary of the school's charitable/educational purpose. It also found that the decedent's own behavior in grossly violating the alcohol policy did not in any way impact upon whether he was a "beneficiary." The court stressed that the inquiry should not focus on the issue of fault, but rather, whether the institution is advancing its purposes and the claimant is benefiting "to any degree." Since the conduct of the university could not have amounted to more than simple negligence, the Appellate Division found that the claim fell within the contemplated protections of the Charitable Immunity Act.

 

Although the question as to whether a particular claimant is a "beneficiary" of the works of a charitable institution still requires a case by case analysis, the opinion in the matter of Orzech v. Fairleigh Dickinson University will certainly be interpreted as precluding negligence claims against any educational institutions by students residing on their premises; a protection, which many, no doubt, will feel to be too broad and ripe for further challenge.
 
Click Here For A Copy Of The Court's Opinion
 
 
 

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