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The Insurable Interest TM
From The Attorneys Of
Powell & Associates, LLC
The
Insurable Interest is a newsletter by the attorneys of Powell &
Associates, LLC. We specialize in Insurance Defense and
Insurance Coverage law in New Jersey
and New York.
We strive to keep ourselves informed of new developments
relevant to our practice and the needs of our clients. This
newsletter is our way of sharing this valuable information with
our clients and colleagues in the insurance industry.
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N.Y. Passes Law Requiring
Insurers to Show Prejudice When Disclaiming for Late Notice
Governor
David Patterson has signed legislation which prohibits insurers from
denying coverage based on late notice of claim, unless the carrier
can prove prejudice as a result of the late notice. Under the
new law if a claim is brought within two years, it is the insurer's
burden to prove that the late notice "materially impaired the
ability of the insurer to investigate or defend the
claim." The burden shifts to the policyholder or claimant
if notice was first provided to the insurer after two years. In
addition, there is an "irrebuttable" presumption of
prejudice in the event the insured's liability has been determined by
a court or arbitrator, or the insured has resolved the claim by
settlement. The law also permits a claimant to file
suit directly against a tortfeasor's insurer when the insurer's
denial of coverage is based on late notice. The law will take
effect in 2009.
With this new legislation New York law will no longer be the
exception when it comes to disclaimer of coverage based on late
notice. It further provides insurers and policyholders with
more certainty as to the definition of "prejudice," which
can be lacking in other jurisdictions where common law judicial
rulings have created different standards depending on the
circumstances of individual cases.
Click here for a complete copy of the Assembly Bill.
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N.J.
Supreme Court Holds That Intentional and Criminal Acts Exclusion Bars
Coverage for All Insureds Under Homeowner's Policy
The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling finding that an
exclusion in a homeowner's policy for "intentional or criminal
acts of an insured person," bars coverage for all
"insureds" under the policy and not just the insured who
committed the intentional or criminal act.
In Villa v.
Short the plaintiff filed suit against her
uncle alleging that he sexually abused her between the ages of
approximately five and ten. The uncle, who may have had a
mental disability, was a lifelong resident in a home owned by his
parents (the plaintiff's grandparents). The plaintiff also
filed a claim for negligent supervision of the uncle against her
grandparents. The grandparents tendered the suit to their
homeowner's carrier seeking a defense and indemnification for the
negligence claims. The carrier declined coverage based on an
intentional and criminal acts exclusion.
The intentional and criminal acts exclusion stated:
We do not cover any bodily injury or
property damage
which
may reasonably be expected to result from the
intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which
is in fact intended by an insured person.
The grandparents argued that the phrase "an" insured could
be interpreted as meaning "each" insured, and that the
policy should be construed to exclude coverage only for the specific
insured who committed the intentional or criminal act. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the phrase "an
insured" is to be read as synonymous with "any
insured." Consequently the Court ruled that the
intentional acts of one insured person "excludes all insureds
from coverage for damages caused" by such an act.
The opinion contains a fairly lengthy dissent which challenges the
conclusions of the majority and argues that a "severability of
interest" clause should have entitled the grandparents to a
separate coverage analysis on the negligence claims.
It should be noted, however, that the carrier later modified the
"severability" clause to impose "joint
obligations" binding on all insureds. This re-drafting
would seem to end the issue raised in the dissent.
Click here for a complete copy of the Court's
opinion.
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The New
Jersey Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to interpret a
"Service of Suit" clause, which is commonly found in
certain insurance contracts. In Chubb Custom Insurance Co. v. The
Prudential Insurance Company of America, the
policy in question contained a Service of Suit clause that stated
that Chubb Custom Insurance Co.:
at the request of the Insured, will submit
to the
jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction within
the United States of America and will comply with all
requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction
and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in
accordance with the law and practice of such Court.
Chubb issued a $50 million professional liability policy to
Prudential. Prudential demanded indemnification from Chubb
after Prudential Securities (a subsidiary) was held liable by an Ohio
jury for certain unauthorized reallocations of assets in retirement
accounts. Chubb declined based on an exclusion for fraudulent acts. Chubb then
filed a declaratory judgment suit in its home state of New Jersey
seeking to uphold the disclaimer of coverage. Shortly thereafter,
Prudential filed suit in Delaware seeking coverage under the
policy. Prudential then successfully moved to dismiss the New
Jersey action.
The trial
judge granted Prudential's dismissal motion based on the argument
that the Service of Suit clause was a forum selection clause that
gave Prudential the choice of forum in all instances. The
Appellate Court reversed and the case then came before the New Jersey
Supreme Court.
The Court's opinion also provided the following brief history of the
Service of Suit clause:
Developed by Lloyd's of London, the clause
was limned
to counter competitors' arguments that Lloyd's was not
amenable to process in the United States and that
potential customers thus should place their business
with a domestic company.
Concomitantly, the clause was intended to
assure potential
insureds that if they purchased a Lloyd's
policy, disputes
would be governed by the law of the United States and not
the law of Britain. The clause became a fixture in Lloyd's
policies and later in policies of other insurers, essentially
operating to guarantee that the insurer would
submit to the
insured's suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in the
United States, thus obviating concerns over whether the
insurer could be held liable in a coverage action.
With that history as a guide, the Court held that while a Service of
Suit clause is an agreement by the insurer to submit to personal
jurisdiction in the court in which the insured has filed a coverage
dispute, the clause also permits the insurer to institute its own
suit in the first instance. The Court further explained that
the clause does not allow an insured to "trump" a suit
filed by an insurer by later filing suit in an alternate forum.
In short, the clause does not give an insured the right to
choose the forum where the matter will be litigated.
Since the
clause was originally added to reassure insureds that their insurance
company would make itself available to litigate coverage disputes,
this seems to be a common sense interpretation of the policy
language. The decision, however, does have the potential to
unleash a "race to the courthouse," with each side rushing
to file suit first. Accordingly insurers and insureds should
remain aware of this issue. In particular when a claim arises
the parties should determine whether a lawsuit could be filed in more
than one state and then conduct research regarding any differences in
the applicable state laws.
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The
Appellate Division of the N.J. Superior Court has ruled that
liability coverage for what appeared to be a "slip &
fall" on ice rests with an automobile carrier and not the
insurer for the premises on which the fall occurred.
In Penn National Insurance Co. v. Costa, the underlying claim
involved a gentleman who sustained injury due to slipping on an
accumulation of ice and snow. Due to the fall he struck his
head on the top of a bumper jack being used to change a tire on a
truck and suffered fairly significant injuries including a skull
fracture and coma. The injured man was on his lunch break when
he approached his boss (Costa) and offered to assist him with
changing a flat tire. Costa declined the offer of assistance and the
slip and fall occurred almost immediately thereafter. The
incident occurred in the driveway of Costa's home, which was adjacent
to his trucking business. The home was insured by Farmers Insurance
Co. of Flemington.
The homewoner's policy expressly excluded "bodily injury . . .
arising out of . . . [t]he maintenance, operation, ownership, or use
(including loading or unloading) of any . . . motor vehicles . . .
owned or operated by . . . any insured." Accordingly they declined
coverage for the claims made by the injured man, as well as those
made by his auto carrier, Penn National, which sought reimbursement
for Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits.
While denying their own responsibility, Farmers sought a declaration
that Costa's auto carrier, Gulf Insurance Co. owed coverage for the
loss.
The Appellate Court found that the loss did "arise out of . . .
the maintenance" of a motor vehicle, despite the fact that the
incident seems to have been caused by the condition of the driveway,
i.e., the ice and snow. The Court stated that the injuries
"were directly connected with the maintenance of Costa's
pick-up" and not "solely related to the existence of ice
and snow."
Accordingly, the Court found that the claim fell within the exclusionary
language of the homeowner's policy and declared the automobile
liability carrier (Gulf Insurance Co.) to be the appropriate entity
to provide coverage.
Understandably, the insurers did not raise the issue of
whether there could be coverage under both policies, and the
Court used an "either/or" approach to resolve the
dispute between the carriers. In doing so the Court avoided
the yet unanswered question of whether there could
be coverage under both the homeowner's policy and the automobile
policy. "Overlapping or joint coverage" was
previously suggested as being the appropriate result in Judge
Brochin's concurring opinion in Home State Ins. Co. ex rel. Randell v.
Continental Ins. Co., 313 N.J. Super.
584 (App. Div. 1998), affirmed 158 N.J. 104
(1999). That case arose out of an assault on a school bus and
there was a similar coverage dispute between the homeowner's and
automobile insurance carriers. Thus, New Jersey courts continue
to hold that only one policy provides coverage where the exclusionary
language of one policy matches the covering language of another.
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Volume: I
Issue: II
August 2008
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PLEASE CONTACT US WITH YOUR
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
POWELL & ASSOCIATES, LLC
Attorneys At Law
131 White Oak Lane
Old Bridge, NJ 08857
(732) 679-3777
Fax:
(732) 679-6433 www.lawppl.com
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